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Abstract
Voters from m disjoint constituencies (regions, federal states, etc.) are represented in an
assembly which contains one delegate from each constituency and applies a weighted voting
rule. All agents are assumed to have single-peaked preferences over an interval; each delegate’s
preferences match his constituency’s median voter; and the collective decision equals the
assembly’s Condorcet winner. We characterize the asymptotic behavior of the probability of
a given delegate determining the outcome (i.e., being the weighted median of medians) in
order to address a contentious practical question: which voting weights w1, . . . ,wm ought to be
selected if constituency sizes differ and all voters are to have a priori equal influence on collective
decisions? It is shown that if ideal point distributions have identical median M and are suitably
continuous, the probability for a given delegate i’s ideal point λi being the Condorcet winner
becomes asymptotically proportional to i’s voting weight wi times λi’s density at M as m→∞.
Indirect representation of citizens is approximately egalitarian for weights proportional to the
square root of constituency sizes if all individual ideal points are i.i.d. In contrast, weights that
are linear in – or, better, induce a Shapley value linear in – size are egalitarian when preferences
are sufficiently strongly affiliated within constituencies.
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tion; Shapley value; pivot probability; quasivalues; voting power
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1 Introduction
The voting weights of delegations to electoral assemblies with a federal or divisional
structure commonly vary in the size of the represented populations, but do so very
differently. The US Electoral College, for instance, involves voter blocs that are broadly
proportional to constituency size: each state has two votes (reflecting its two seats
in the Senate) in addition to a number which is proportional to population (like
House seats). California and Wyoming comprise around 11.9% and 0.2% of the US
population, respectively, and thus end up holding around 10.2% and 0.6% of votes
on the US President. In contrast, the most and least populous member states of
the EU – Germany and Malta – currently have about 8.4% and 0.8% of votes in the
Council of the European Union but comprise 16.3% and 0.1% of the EU population;
the respective mapping from population size to voting weight is, very roughly, a
square root function.1 Delegates in other collective decision-making bodies, such
as the Governing Council of the European Central Bank, the Senate of Canada or
German Bundesrat, and many a university senate or council of a multi-branch NGO,
have voting weights that are yet more concave functions of the number of represented
constituents, or even flat.
This paper concerns two-tier voting systems in which individuals vote on delegates
or representatives in disjoint constituencies (bottom tier) and these representatives
take collective decisions in a council, electoral college, or other assembly (top tier).
It investigates a practically relevant, normative question: which simple function –
possibly linear, possibly strictly concave or constant – should determine the top-tier
voting weights of delegates from differently sized constituencies such as US states or
EU member countries? The considered objective is not one of efficiently aggregating
private information (see, e.g., Bouton and Castanheira 2012) or of maximizing a
utilitarian measure of welfare as investigated, for instance, by Barbera` and Jackson
(2006). We focus on the egalitarian criterion of ‘one person, one vote’ and on providing
all bottom-tier voters, at least a priori and under very stylized ideal conditions,
with equal influence on the collective decision. This is studied in a model where
the respective median voter determines a constituency’s top-tier policy position
and the assembly’s Condorcet winner defines its collective decision. The relation of
heterogeneity within each constituency and heterogeneity across constituencies turns out to
be the critical determinant of the fair voting weight allocation. Linear and square
root weighting rules emerge in particularly prominent benchmark cases. The former
is advisable for electorates that are polarized along constituency lines, i.e., exhibit
significant heterogeneity across constituencies; while the latter is more egalitarian
1A least squares power-law regression of EU Council voting weights wi on population sizes ni
results in wi = c ·n0.47i with R2 ≈ 0.95. The current Council voting rules involve two other but essentially
negligible criteria, and will be changed in 2017 into a more proportional system.
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when heterogeneity within each constituency is dominant.
The ‘one person, one vote’ principle is linked to the requirement of anonymity
in social choice, that is, collective decisions shall depend only on the votes that the
alternatives receive, not on whose votes these are. This general egalitarian norm is
sometimes considered the minimum requirement for a decision-making procedure to
be called ‘democratic’ (e.g., Dahl 1956, p. 37). It is straightforward to implement –
at least in theory – in case of a direct, single-tier voting procedure or a two-tier
one with symmetric constituencies. Complications arise when a two-tier system
is asymmetric. A non-trivial integer apportionment problem already needs to be
resolved for those assemblies, like parliaments, in which delegates from the same
constituency can split their votes and thus reflect heterogeneity among constituents
(see Balinski and Young 2001). And apportionment gets much more difficult when all
representatives of a constituency vote as a bloc (as in the US Electoral College, with
two exceptions) or, equivalently, when the assembly contains a single delegate from
each constituency who is endowed with a voting weight that varies in population size
(as in the EU Council).
A way to adapt the principle to such situations has very vaguely been suggested
by the US Supreme Court, requiring “that each citizen have an equally effective voice
in the election” (cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 1964, p. 565; emphasis added by
the authors). Here, we operationalize equal efficacy or influence by comparing the
a priori probabilities of individual voters being decisive or pivotal for the collective
decision. The corresponding joint event of (i) a given voter determining her delegate’s
vote and of (ii) this representative determining the assembly’s collective decision is
admittedly a rare one. Still, while all being close to zero, the resulting individual pivot
probabilities can vary widely across constituencies when weights are chosen arbitrarily.
They should not if an institutional designer wants to fix voting weights (or bloc sizes)
which are fair at least from behind the constitutional ‘veil of ignorance’ – that is, when
preference patterns of the day are ignored for practical or normative reasons.
The objective of equalizing the a priori influence of each citizen on collective
decisions was first formally considered by Lionel S. Penrose in 1946, when the
institutional design of a successor to the League of Nations – today’s United Nations
Organization (UNO) – was being discussed.2 Penrose (1946) showed that the most
intuitive solution to the weight allocation problem, i.e., weights proportional to
constituency sizes, ignores “elementary statistics of majority voting”. Namely, if
there are only two policy alternatives (‘yes’ and ‘no’) and all individual decisions are
statistically independent and equiprobable then the probability of an individual voter
being pivotal in her constituency with ni voters, which for odd ni corresponds to
2Informal investigations date back to anti-federalist writings by Luther Martin, a delegate from
Maryland to the Constitutional Convention in Philadelphia in 1787. See Riker (1986).
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the probability of ni − 1 voters being divided into ‘yes’ and ‘no’-camps of same size,
is approximately
√
2/
√
pini (apply Stirling’s formula when evaluating the binomial
distribution function). So a voter from a constituencyCi which is four times larger than
constituencyC j a priori faces a smaller probability of tipping the scales locally; but this
probability is still half rather than only a quarter of the reference one. Consequently,
top-tier voting weights should be such that the pivot probability of constituency Ci
at the top tier is twice – not four times – that of C j in order to equalize the indirect
influence of all citizens.
The corresponding practical suggestion is also known as the Penrose square root rule.
Despite criticism that it treats voting decisions too much like coin tosses, the rule has
provided a benchmark for numerous applied studies which consider the distribution
of voting power in the EU, US, or IMF (including Felsenthal and Machover 2001,
2004; Grofman and Feld 2005; Fidrmuc et al. 2009; Leech and Leech 2009; Miller
2009, 2012; Kirsch and Langner 2011). And though practitioners may not care about
Penrose’s reasoning itself – for instance, when the EU heads of state and government
bargained on new, post-2017 voting rules for the Council – they have invoked Penrose’s
suggestion when it fitted their interests.3
The special role of square root weight allocation rules has been confirmed, qualified,
and disputed in a number of studies on two-tier voting systems, both empirically
(see Gelman et al. 2002; 2004) and theoretically. The respective constitutional
objective functions and practical conclusions of these investigations vary. Besides
the equalization of a priori influence (Chamberlain and Rothschild 1981; Felsenthal
and Machover 1998; Laruelle and Valenciano 2008b; Kaniovski 2008), they consider
utilitarian welfare maximization (e.g., Beisbart et al. 2005; Barbera` and Jackson 2006;
Beisbart and Bovens 2007; Laruelle and Valenciano 2008b; Koriyama et al. 2012)
and the avoidance of majoritarian paradoxes like having a Bush majority in the
2000 Electoral College despite a Gore majority in the population at large (Felsenthal
and Machover 1999; Kirsch 2007; Feix et al. 2008). Several departures from Penrose’s
independence and equiprobability assumptions have been considered. However, the
related literature has focused almost entirely on binary political decisions, with no
scope for bargaining and strategic interaction.4
The existing results hence provide useful guidance and arguments in thorny
debates on the ‘right’ weight allocation only to the extent that the assemblies in
3A particularly notorious case involved the then Polish president and prime minister in the
negotiations of the Treaty of Lisbon. See, e.g., The Economist (2007, June 14th).
4We are aware of the following exceptions only: Laruelle and Valenciano (2008a) suggest a “neutral”
top-tier voting rule when policy alternatives give rise to a Nash bargaining problem. Le Breton et al.
(2012) investigate fair voting weights in case of the division of a transferable surplus, i.e., for a simplex
of policy alternatives. Maaser and Napel (2007; 2012a; 2012b) conduct simulations for a median voter
environment like the one which we will consider here.
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question indeed decide on dichotomous exogenous proposals. But many decisions
involve several shades of grey. Members of the US Electoral College usually have
binary options, but they face the survivors from a much larger field of initial
contenders, with partly endogenous final political platforms. The EU Council more
commonly decides on the level of subsidies, the scope of regulation, the scale of
financial aid, etc. rather than on having a subsidy, regulation of an industry, or aid
per se. It seems relevant, therefore, to analyze the fair choice of voting weights (and
alternative objectives such as utilitarian welfare) for somewhat richer than binary
{0, 1}-policy spaces, too.
This paper considers the equalization of pivot probabilities for a one-dimensional
convex policy space, i.e., for choices from a real interval. We assume single-peaked
preferences with random ideal points for all voters, perfect congruence between
preferences of a constituency’s delegate and its median voter, and collective decisions
which correspond to the Condorcet winner or the core of the game defined by preferences
and weights of the delegates. The latter can be seen as the equilibrium outcome of
strategic bargaining (see, e.g., Banks and Duggan 2000).
In this model, the collective choice equals the weighted median among agents
whose ideal points themselves are medians from disjoint samples. This is a very
stylized representation of democratic decision making but yet richer than the binary
model a` la Penrose. The former nests the latter in case that ideal points have a discrete
two-point distribution. In case of less trivial distributions, little can analytically be
said about the order statistics of medians from differently sized samples; and next to
nothing has so far been known about the combinatorial function therefrom which
corresponds to the respective weighted median of non-identically distributed random
variables.
We here derive a general analytical result on the ratio of two delegates’ pivot
probabilities in an infinite increasing chain of collective decision bodies (Theorem 1).
Each delegate i is characterized by his voting weight wi and single-peaked preferences
with a random ideal point λi that has the probability density function fi. In line
with the veil of ignorance perspective of constitutional design, this random variable
is a priori assumed to have the same theoretical median for all delegates – say, M = 0.
It is shown then that, under suitable regularity conditions, a delegate’s probability
of finding his ideal point coincide with the corresponding voting game’s Condorcet
winner is asymptotically proportional to the probability density fi(M) at the theoretical median
times his assigned voting weight wi.
This main analytical result has several practical corollaries for two-tier voting
systems. In particular, if all individual voters are – behind the constitutional veil of
ignorance – conceived of as having ideal points that are independent and identically
distributed (i.i.d.), then the sample median from a constituency Ci with ni members
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has an asymptotically normal distribution whose standard deviation is inversely
proportional to the square root of ni. The probability density of representative i’s ideal
point at the theoretical median M is hence proportional to
√
ni. It follows that voting
weights wi that are chosen to be proportional to
√
ni for all constituencies Ci render
the top-tier pivot probabilities of all representatives proportional to their population
sizes; this approximately equalizes the expected influence or efficacy of the vote across
the population. How close one gets to full equalization depends on the considered
number m of constituencies as well as the population partition at hand.5
The optimality of a square root allocation of voting weights is, however, restricted
to the case of individual ideal points being i.i.d. and the use of a 50%-majority
threshold. Assuming that voters’ ideal points are subject to identical random shocks
within constituencies – which introduces positive correlation among members of the
same constituency – implies greater variance of the respective sample medians. The
latter’s distributions become more and more similar across constituencies if the shock
distribution H is identical for all constituencies Ci and its variance σ2H increases. If
this measure σ2H of heterogeneity across constituencies is sufficiently great relative to
the heterogeneity within each constituency, which is captured by the variance σ2G of the
(conditional) ideal point distribution G under a zero shock, then an approximately
linear weight allocation becomes optimal.
That a linear weighting rule is optimal in this case follows as a corollary from
Theorem 1 when top-tier decisions are taken by simple majority. But, as made
precise by Theorem 2, the finding can be extended to supermajority requirements.
In particular, one can approximate the pivot probabilities of top-tier delegates by the
Shapley value of the respective weighted voting game when σ2H/σ
2
G is sufficiently large.
Even if the number of constituencies m is relatively small, one can hence achieve
equal representation by finding voting weights such that the resulting Shapley value
is proportional to population sizes, or as close to being proportional as is feasible.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we spell out
our model of two-tier decision making and the institutional design problem. Our
main result for simple majority rule and m → ∞, as well as its corollary in case that
individual ideal points are i.i.d. are presented in Section 3. We then explore the effect
of adding heterogeneity across constituencies to that within, and study asymptotic
behavior with respect to the ‘across’-kind for fixed m in Section 4. We conclude in
Section 5 and provide proofs of the two theorems in an appendix.
5The approximation can be improved if one bases the weight choice on the induced Shapley value
or, with comparable effects, the Penrose-Banzhaf power index. See Dubey and Shapley (1979), Felsenthal
and Machover (1998) or Laruelle and Valenciano (2008b) for good overviews on these and other power
measures.
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2 Model and Design Problem
We consider partitions Cm = {C1, . . . ,Cm} of a large number n of voters into m < n
disjoint constituencies with ni = |Ci| > 0 members each. The preferences of any voter
l ∈ {1, . . . ,n} = ⋃i Ci are assumed to be single-peaked with ideal point νl in a convex
one-dimensional policy space X ⊆ R, i.e., in a finite or infinite real interval. These ideal
points are conceived of as realizations of random variables with a priori identical,
absolutely continuous distributions. A given profile (ν1, . . . , νn) of ideal points is
interpreted as reflecting voter preferences in an abstract left–right spectrum or on
a specific one-dimensional policy issue (a transfer, an emission standard, a capital
requirement, etc.).
A collective decision x∗ ∈ X on the issue at hand is taken by an assembly or council
of representatives Rm which consists of one representative from each constituency.
Without committing to any particular procedure for internal preference aggregation,
political competition, lobbying or bargaining, it will be assumed that preferences ofCi’s
representative coincide with those of its respective median voter, i.e., representative i
has the random ideal point
λi ≡ median {νl : l ∈ Ci}. (1)
For simplicity we take all ni as odd numbers,6 and leave aside agency problems or
other reasons for why the preferences of a constituency’s representative might not be
congruent or at least sensitive to its median voter.7
In the top-tier assemblyRm, constituencyCi has voting weight wi ≥ 0. Any coalition
S ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} of representatives which achieves a combined weight ∑ j∈S w j above
qm ≡ 0.5
m∑
j=1
w j, (2)
i.e., which has a simple majority of total weight, is winning and can pass proposals to
implement some policy x ∈ X.
Let · : m be the random permutation of {1, . . . ,m} that makes λk : m the k-th leftmost
ideal point among the representatives for any realization of λ1, . . . , λm (that is, λk : m is
6For an even number ni, one could let each of the two middlemost ideal points in Ci define the
representative i’s preferences with equal probability. Or one works with the usual definition of the
median, i.e., their arithmetic mean, and focuses on the probability of event {∂x∗/∂νi > 0} rather than
the – no longer equivalent – event {x∗ = νi} in what follows. Napel and Widgre´n (2004) discuss in detail
how influence in voting procedures can be quantified by outcome sensitivity measures like ∂x∗/∂νi.
7See, e.g., Gerber and Lewis (2004) for empirical evidence on how the median voter and partisan
pressures jointly explain legislator preferences, and for a short discussion of the related theoretical
literature. It is important to note that Theorems 1 and 2 will not require (1) to hold – they only assume
λi’s density to have certain properties.
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the k-th order statistic). We will disregard the zero probability events of two or more
constituencies having identical ideal points and define the random variable P by
P ≡ min
{
j ∈ {1, . . . ,m} :
j∑
k=1
wk:m > qm
}
. (3)
Representative P : m’s ideal point, λP : m, cannot be beaten by any alternative x ∈ X in a
pairwise vote, i.e., it is in the core of the voting game defined by ideal points λ1, . . . , λm,
weights w1, . . . ,wm and quota qm. We assume that the policy x∗ agreed by Rm lies in
the core. So x∗ must equal λP : m whenever the core is single-valued; then λP : m actually
beats every other alternative x ∈ X and is the so-called Condorcet winner in Rm. In
order to avoid inessential case distinctions, we assume that Rm agrees on λP : m also in
the knife-edge case of the entire interval [λP−1: m, λP : m] being majority-undominated,
i.e.,8
x∗ ≡ λP : m. (4)
Representative P : m will, therefore, generally be referred to as the pivotal representative
or the weighted median of Rm. Banks and Duggan (2000) and Cho and Duggan
(2009) provide equilibrium analysis of non-cooperative legislative bargaining which
supports policy outcomes inside or close to the core.
The event {x∗ = νl} of voter l’s ideal point coinciding with the collective decision
almost surely entails that sufficiently small perturbations or idiosyncratic shifts of νl
translate into identical shifts of x∗, so that ∂x∗/∂νl > 0. Voter l can then meaningfully
be said to influence, be decisive or pivotal for, or even to determine the collective decision.
This event has probability
pl ≡ Pr(x∗ = νl), (5)
which depends on the joint distribution of (ν1, . . . , νn) and the voting weights w1, . . . ,wm
that have been selected for Rm. Even though pl will be very small given that the
set of voters {1, . . . ,n} is assumed to be large, it would constitute a violation of the
‘one person, one vote’ principle if pl/pk differed substantially from unity for any
l, k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
We will assume throughout our analysis that all voter ideal points are a priori
identically distributed, in line with adopting a ‘veil of ignorance’-perspective when one
analyzes the efficacy of individual votes or a priori influence of voters. Moreover,
it is assumed that ideal points are mutually independent across constituencies. We
8A sufficient condition for the core to be single-valued is that the vector of weights satisfies
∑
j∈S w j ,
qm for each S ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}. In the non-generic cases where this is violated, tie-breaking assumptions
analogous to fn. 6 can be made. Note that no constituency’s median voter will have an incentive
to ‘choose’ a representative whose preferences differ from her own ones, that is, to misrepresent
preferences, if x∗ is determined by (4) (cf. Moulin 1980; Nehring and Puppe 2007).
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do, however, allow for a specific form of ideal points being dependent within each
constituency. Namely, we conceive of the ideal point νl of any voter l ∈ Ci as the sum
νl = µi + 
l (6)
of a constituency-specific random variable µi, which has distribution H, and a voter-
specific random variable l with absolutely continuous distribution G. The voter-
specific variables 1, . . . , n and constituency shocks µ1, . . . , µm are all taken to be
mutually independent. If distribution H of µi is non-degenerate, it reflects a common
attitude component of preferences within the disjoint constituencies. G and H are the
same for all voters l ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and constituencies Ci ∈ Cm. This ensures that indeed
all ideal points ν1, . . . , νn are identically distributed. G’s variance σ2G can be interpreted
as a measure of heterogeneity within each constituency, reflecting the natural variation
of political preferences. Similarly, σ2H is a measure of heterogeneity across constituencies:
even though it is assumed that opinions in all constituencies vary between left–right,
religious–secular, etc. in a similar manner, the locations of the respective ranges of
opinion can differ between constituencies. The corresponding correlation coefficient
for two voters l, k ∈ Ci from the same constituency is σ2H/(σ2H + σ2G). The case in which
H is degenerate with σ2H = 0 involves heterogeneity only within constituencies; the
latter differ in size but voter ideal points vl are independent and identically distributed
across the entire population. We regard this as a particularly important benchmark
and will refer to it as the i.i.d. case.
With this notation, we can now state our objective of operationalizing the ‘one
person, one vote’ principle somewhat more formally. Namely, given a partition Cm =
{C1, . . . ,Cm} of n voters into constituencies and distributions G and H which describe
heterogeneity of individual preferences within and across constituencies, we would
like to find voting weights w1, . . . ,wm such that each voter a priori has an equal chance
of determining the collective decision x∗ ∈ X – that is, such that
pl
pk
= 1 for all l, k ∈ {1, . . . ,n}. (7)
For most combinations of Cm, G, and H, condition (7) cannot be satisfied by any
weight vector (w1, . . . ,wm). This is due to the discrete nature of weighted voting.9
So the problem would need to be formulated more precisely as that of minimizing
a specific notion of distance between the probability vector (p1, . . . , pn) induced by
w1, . . . ,wm and (1/n, . . . , 1/n) ∈ Rn.
9For instance, there are only 117 structurally different weighted voting games with m = 5
constituencies even if all majority thresholds between 0% and 100% are permitted. This number
(related to Dedekind’s problem in discrete mathematics) grows very fast, but the set of distinct feasible
influence distributions remains finite.
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The actual concern, however, is not with finding the respective optimal solution
to such a (non-trivial) discrete minimization problem for a particular partition Cm
and specific distributions G and H. Rather, our objective is to find a simple function
which maps n1, . . . ,nm to weights w1, . . . ,wm that induce pl/pk ≈ 1 for all l and
k, that is, which approximately satisfy the ‘one person, one vote’ criterion, for
arbitrary non-pathological partitions Cm.10 Preferably, qualitative information on
heterogeneity within and across constituencies should suffice in guiding possible
design recommendations.
The stated assumptions imply that, when considering any given realization of µi,
ideal points νl and νk are conditionally independent if l, k ∈ Ci for some i. They are in
any case identically distributed. In particular, pl = pk holds for l, k ∈ Ci irrespective of
which G, H, and voting weights w1, . . . ,wm are considered, and it must be the case that
if l ∈ Ci then
Pr(νl = λi) =
1
ni
. (8)
So, an individual voter’s probability to be her constituency’s median and to determine
λi is inversely proportional to constituency Ci’s population size.
The events {νl = λi} and {x∗ = λi} are independent given our statistical assumptions.
(Note that the first event only entails information about the identity ofCi’s median, not
its location.) It follows that the probability pl for an individual voter l ∈ Ci influencing
the collective decision x∗ is 1/ni times the probability of event {x∗ = λi} or, equivalently,
of {P : m = i}. Letting
pii(Rm) ≡ Pr(P : m = i) (9)
denote the probability of constituencyCi’s representative being pivotal inRm (that is, of
λi being the respective Condorcet winner in case of generic weights), our institutional
design objective hence consists of solving the following
Problem of Equal Representation:
Find a simple mapping from constituency sizes n1, . . . ,nm to voting weights
w1, . . . ,wm for the representatives in Rm such that
pii(Rm)
pi j(Rm) ≈
ni
n j
for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. (10)
One might conjecture that, if m is large enough and the weight distribution is not overly
skewed, voting weight wi should translate linearly into representative i’s influence
10By pathological partitions we, for instance, mean ones where constituency sizes ni increase
exponentially in i. – There is no need to specify exactly which functions are “simple” enough. Power
laws, i.e., choosing wi = βnαi for some α, β ∈ R, certainly qualify and turn out to constitute a sufficiently
rich class of mappings.
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pii(Rm).11 But the distribution of the respective ideal points λi will certainly play a
role, too, and so the solution to this problem will depend on how heterogeneity of
individual preferences within and across constituencies relate.
Note that, if the representatives’ ideal points λ1, . . . , λm were not only mutually
independent but also had identical distributions Fi = F j for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, then
all orderings of λ1, . . . , λm would a priori be equally likely. In this case, pii(Rm) would
coincide with i’s Shapley value φi(v), where v is the characteristic function of the m-
player cooperative game in which the worth v(S) of a coalition S ⊆ {1, . . . ,m} is 1 if∑
j∈S w j > qm and 0 otherwise, and12
φi(v) ≡
∑
S⊆{1,...,m}r{i}
|S|! · (m − |S| − 1)!
m!
[v(S ∪ {i}) − v(S)]. (11)
The way to solve the problem of equal representation would then simply be to
search for a weighted voting game which induces a Shapley value proportional to
(n1, . . . ,nm). Unfortunately, if we assume that distribution G, which generates the
private component l in individual ideal points νl, is non-degenerate then (1) implies
that Fi = F j if and only if ni = n j. The case in which this holds for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
is precisely the one in which equal representation is trivial, i.e., achieved by giving
all representatives identical weights because n1 = . . . = nm.13 In particular, Fi second-
order stochastically dominates distribution F j (or F j is a mean-preserving spread of
Fi) if ni > n j because the sample median of ni independent draws from G has smaller
variance than that of just n j < ni draws; and the respective draw from H adds identical
11 Asymptotic proportionality between weights and voting power has first been investigated by
Penrose (1952) in the context of binary alternatives. Related formal results by Neyman (1982), Lindner
and Machover (2004), Snyder et al. (2005), Jelnov and Tauman (2012) and Theorem 1 below suppose
that the relative weight of any given voter becomes negligible as more and more voters are added. The
case when relative weights of a few large voters fail to vanish as m → ∞ – giving rise to oceanic games
and typically non-proportionality – has been treated by Shapiro and Shapley (1978) and Dubey and
Shapley (1979). The limit behavior of pivot probabilities for uniform weights (as at the bottom tier) has
been studied in more complex models than Penrose’s by Chamberlain and Rothschild (1981), Myerson
(2000), Gelman et al. (2002), and Kaniovski (2008).
12See Shapley (1953). For so-called simple games – in which v(S) ∈ {0, 1} for all S ⊆ N, v(∅) = 0,
v(N) = 1, and v(S) = 1 ⇒ v(T) = 1 if S ⊆ T – the Shapley value is also referred to as the Shapley-Shubik
power index, following the first suggestion of using φ in order to evaluate power in voting bodies by
Shapley and Shubik (1954). We write v = [qm; w1, . . . ,wm] if v is defined by the weighted voting rule
[qm; w1, . . . ,wm].
13We remark that re-partitioning the population into constituencies of equal size – i.e., appropriate
redistricting – is, of course, a trivial possibility for altogether evading the considered problem. Our
analysis is concerned with those cases where historical, geographical, cultural, and other reasons
exogenously have defined a partition Cm which cannot easily be changed. See Coate and Knight
(2007) on socially optimal districting and Gul and Pesendorfer (2010) on strategic issues which arise
for redistricting. We also disregard another relevant strategic feature of two-tier voting: incentives to
allocate limited campaign resources to the constituencies. We refer the reader to Stro¨mberg (2008).
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variance to both λi and λ j.
In the i.i.d. benchmark case, in whichσ2H = 0 and the only acknowledged differences
between two voters from distinct constituencies are the numbers of their fellow
constituents, one can be more specific than stochastic dominance. Namely, a standard
result about the sample median of i.i.d. random variables is:
Lemma 1. Let X1, . . . ,Xs be i.i.d. random variables with median M and a density f that
is continuous at M with f (M) > 0. Then random variable Y = median {X1, . . . ,Xs} is
asymptotically (M, σ2)-normally-distributed with
σ2 =
1
s [2 f (M)]2
(12)
i.e., the re-scaled sample median 2 f (M)
√
s[Y −M] of X1, . . . ,Xs converges in distribution to
N(0, 1) as s→∞.
See, e.g., Arnold et al. (1992, Theorem 8.5.1) for a proof. It follows that in the i.i.d. case,
ideal pointsλ1, . . . , λm in assemblyRm are (approximately) normally distributed14 with
identical means but standard deviations that are inversely proportional to the square root
of the respective constituency sizes. So, in the i.i.d. case, rather than all orderings
of λ1, . . . , λm being equally likely (φ(v)’s implicit assertion), the representative of a
constituency Ci which is four times larger than constituency C j has twice the chances
to find itself in the middle. (Recall that normal density at the mean and median is
inversely proportional to standard deviation.) Then weights that are proportional to
population sizes, or weights such that φ(v) is, would give representatives of large
constituencies more a priori influence than is due.15
Before we make this reasoning precise in the following section, let us iterate that the
considered median voter model of equal representation in two-tier decision making
is an admittedly big simplification. Many collective decisions involve more than
just a single dimension in which voter preferences differ. Even if the assumption
of a one-dimensional, say, left–right policy space and single-peaked preferences was
granted, systematic abstention of certain social groups could drive a wedge between
14This approximation is very good already for rather moderate sample sizes. If, e.g., individual
ideal points νl are standard uniformly distributed, i.e., l ∼ U[0, 1] and µi ≡ 0, then λi is beta distributed
with parameters a = b = (ni + 1)/2. The corresponding beta and normal density functions can be
regarded as identical for all practical purposes if ni > 100. – Note that Lemma 1 is useful also in case of
a non-degenerate distribution H of µi: it establishes that the precise distribution G of individual shocks
does not matter for λi’s distribution Fi; only g(M), the sufficiently great ni, and H do.
15We are unaware of any systematic empirical evidence for or against the claim that representatives
from larger constituencies tend to be located more centrally in the relevant policy space. This
theoretical prediction is testable in principle but rests on the two assumptions of aggregate preferences
being determined by the median individual and individual ideal points being i.i.d. In view of the
rapid transition towards indistinguishable distributions of representative ideal points when the i.i.d.
assumption is given up (see Section 4), the claim is bound to be difficult to confirm in practice.
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the median voter’s and the median citizen’s preferences.16 We ignore that voting might
involve private information about some state variable (Feddersen and Pesendorfer
1996, 1997; Bouton and Castanheira 2012), and typical agency problems connected
to imperfect monitoring and infrequent delegate selections (for instance, national
elections of the EU Council’s members take place every four to five years). Empirical
evidence highlights that a representative may take positions that differ significantly
from his district’s median when voter preferences within that district are sufficiently
heterogeneous (see, e.g., Gerber and Lewis 2004). Still, we take it that the best intuitions
about fairness are captured by simplifying thought experiments of a ‘veil of ignorance’
kind. The analysis of the described stylized world – no friction, particularly well-
behaved preferences which are a priori identical for all – is useful in this way. It
shows the limitations of and justifications for the simple intuition that weights should
be proportional to the number of represented constituents, in a framework that goes
beyond the binary world analyzed by Penrose (1946) and others.
3 Egalitarian Voting Weights for Many Constituencies
We will in this section consider situations in which the number m of constituencies is
suitably large. Very few tangible results exist on the distribution of order statistics,
like the median, from differently distributed random variables (the representative ideal
points λ1, . . . , λm). And almost nothing seems to be known about the respective
distribution of a weighted median, which is taken to define the collective decision x∗ ∈ X
in our model. It turns out to be possible, nevertheless, to characterize the probability
of some λi being the weighted median, i.e., the pivot probability pii(Rm), as m→∞.
We conceive of R1 ⊂ R2 ⊂ R3 ⊂ . . . as an infinite chain of assemblies in which more
and more constituencies i ∈ N have a representative with a voting weight wi ≥ 0 and
a random ideal point λi with absolutely continuous distribution Fi. Some technical
requirements will be imposed on the corresponding density fi, but it does not matter
if λi is defined by (1) and corresponds to the median of some set of other random ideal
points like {νl}l∈Ci ; it could, for instance, be the average of some ideal points (such as
those of members of a coalition government or oligarchy) or that of a constituency
dictator. So while the problem of equal representation which we stated in Section 3
is the key motivation for investigating pivot probabilities pi1(Rm), . . . , pim(Rm), the
following characterization of their limiting behavior has more general applicability.17
16Parts of the population may be without suffrage (minors, aliens, or prisoners). Penrose (1946,
p. 57) referred to “the square root of the number of people on each nation’s voting list” but the political
discussion of voting weights in the EU Council has almost exclusively referred to population figures. We
here follow this line and use the terms citizens and voters interchangeably.
17In particular, for given F1, . . . ,Fm, pi(Rm) amounts to a specific quasivalue or random order value for
simple games. See, e.g., Monderer and Samet (2002).
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We will return to the issue of designing egalitarian two-tier voting systems after
considering assemblies Rm with rather arbitrary ideal point distributions F1, . . . ,Fm
and weighted voting rules [qm; w1, . . . ,wm].
For weight sequences {wm}m∈N and associated weighted voting games [qm; w1, . . . ,wm]
in which nobody’s relative voting weight is bounded away from zero, the pivot
probability pii(Rm) of any given representative i ∈Nwill converge to zero as m→∞.18
Still, pii(Rm)/pi j(Rm) need not converge. This is illustrated by the sequence {wm}m∈N
with
wm = (1, 2, . . . , 2) ∈ Rm. (13)
Representative 1 is either a dummy player withpi1(Rm) = 0 or, supposing that the ideal
point distributions F1, . . . ,Fm are identical, pii(Rm) = 1m for all i = 1, . . . ,m depending
on whether m is odd or even. So pi1(Rm)/pi2(Rm) alternates between 0 and 1. More
complicated examples of non-convergence can be constructed, e.g., by having {wm}m∈N
oscillate in a suitable fashion.
We rule out such possibilities by imposing a weak form of replica structure on the
considered weights w1,w2,w3, . . . and ideal point distributions F1,F2,F3, . . . Specifically,
we require that all representatives i ∈N belong to one of an arbitrary but finite number
r of representative types θ ∈ {1, . . . , r}. All representatives of the same type θ have an
identical weight wθ and distribution Fθ. And, avoiding somewhat contrived situations
like in (13), we restrict attention to chains R1 ⊂ R2 ⊂ R3 ⊂ . . . in which each type θ
maintains a non-vanishing share of representatives as m→∞.
The key requirements for the following result are that (i) F1,F2,F3 . . . have identical
median M and that (ii) each distribution Fi has a density fi which is locally continuous
and positive at M. In order to allow the application of a powerful uniform convergence
result for the Shapley value by Neyman (1982), continuity will be strengthened to the
requirement that each density fi’s variation at its median, | fi(x) − fi(M)|, can locally
be bounded by a quadratic function cx2. This bound follows readily if fi is C2 like
the normal density functions singled out by Lemma 1, and could be relaxed to cxa
for any a > 1 if one used somewhat less round constants in the proof. Moreover, an
unpublished extension by Abraham Neyman of his 1982 result could be employed
in order to make do with just (ii). Details on this and the proof are presented in
Appendix A.
Theorem 1. Consider an infinite chain R1 ⊂ R2 ⊂ R3 ⊂ . . . of assemblies which involves
a finite number r of representative types, i.e., there exists a mapping τ : N → {1, . . . , r}
such that τ( j) = θ implies that λ j has density fθ and w j = wθ ≥ 0.19 Let the share
18Concerning the Shapley value φ(v), which equals pi(Rm) if F1, . . . ,Fm are identical, Neyman (1982,
Lemma 8.2) has established that φi(v) ≤ 4wi/∑ j>i w j for v = [q; w1, . . . ,wm] with w1 ≥ . . . ≥ wm ≥ 0,∑m
j=1 w j = 1, and 2w1 < q < 1 − 2w1.
19We presume w.l.o.g. that τ(i) = i for i ∈ {1, . . . , r}.
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of each type be bounded away from zero, i.e., there exist β > 0 and m0 ∈ N such that
βθ(m) ≡ |{k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : τ(k) = θ} |/m ≥ β > 0 for all m ≥ m0. If for each θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} the
distribution Fθ has median M and its density fθ satisfies fθ(M) > 0 with | fθ(x)− fθ(M)| ≤ cx2
on a non-empty interval [M − ε1,M + ε1] for some c ≥ 0 then for w j > 0
lim
m→∞
pii(Rm)
pi j(Rm) =
wi fi(M)
w j f j(M)
. (14)
The key observation behind limit result (14) and its corollaries is that, as m grows
large, the pivotal member ofRm is most likely found very close to the common median
M of ideal point distributions F1, . . . ,Fm. Pivotality at location x ∈ X requires that less
than half the total weight of Rm’s members is located in (−∞, x) and less than half the
total weight is found in (x,∞). In expectation, this occurs exactly at x = M and, by
Hoeffding’s inequality, the probability for the realized weighted median in Rm to fall
outside an ε-neighborhood of M approaches zero exponentially fast as m→∞.
One can, therefore, restrict attention to an arbitrarily small interval [−ε, ε] ⊂
[−ε1, ε1] for sufficiently large m if w.l.o.g. M = 0. Since the densities f1(x), . . . , fm(x)
satisfy the mentioned kind of continuity, they can suitably be approximated by upper
and lower bounds on this interval. Moreover, when we condition on the respective
events {λ j ∈ [−ε, ε]}, the corresponding bounds are almost identical for any j = 1, . . . ,m
when m is sufficiently large. This makes all orderings of those representatives
with ideal points in [−ε, ε] conditionally equiprobable in very good approximation.
Representative i’s respective conditional pivot probability, therefore, corresponds
to i’s Shapley value in a ‘subgame’ which involves only the representatives j with
realizations λ j ∈ [−ε, ε]. It is possible to apply the uniform convergence result for the
Shapley value proven by Neyman (1982) to each of these subgames. In the final step of
the proof, it then remains to exploit that the probability of the condition {λi ∈ [−ε, ε]}
being true becomes proportional to λi’s density at 0 when ε ↓ 0.20
Theorem 1 provides a rather general answer to the posed problem of equal
representation in the case that many constituencies are involved. In particular,
comparison of (10) and (14) immediately yields
Corollary 1. If m is sufficiently large then choosing
(w1, . . . ,wm) ∝
(
n1
f1(M)
, . . . ,
nm
fm(M)
)
(15)
20 At an intuitive level, one may even directly think of the limit case ε = 0: if one conditions
on representative i’s ideal point being located at x = M = 0, i.e., {λi = 0}, then each representative
j , i is equally likely found to i’s left or right (because F j(M) = 12 ). In this case, i’s conditional
pivot probability equals i’s Penrose-Banzhaf power index, which, like the Shapley value, becomes
proportional to (w1, . . . ,wm) for the replica-like weight sequences that we consider. (See Lindner and
Machover 2004 and Lindner and Owen 2007 on the corresponding limit result.)
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achieves approximately equal representation (as formalized by condition (10)) if the technical
conditions of Theorem 1 are verified by f1, . . . , fm.
If m∞, the approximation of the conditional pivot probabilities for ideal points
in a neighborhood of the common median M, which is obtained by (a) considering
the limit case of orderings being conditionally equiprobable and (b) by applying
Neyman’s limit result for the Shapley value, need not be very good. The latter source
of imprecision can be avoided by computing the Shapley value φ(v) for the simple
game v = [qm; w1, . . . ,wm] which is defined by representatives’ weights and simple
majority rule as described in Section 2. The suggestion in Corollary 1 can hence be
improved somewhat if (15) is replaced by
(w1, . . . ,wm) such that φ(qm; w1, . . . ,wm) ∝
(
n1
f1(M)
, . . . ,
nm
fm(M)
)
. (16)
We conclude this section by specifically considering the benchmark i.i.d. case, in
which the ideal points ν1, . . . , νn correspond just to voter-specific random variables
1, . . . , n that are independent and identically distributed with a suitable probability
density function g, and where λi corresponds to the median ideal point in Ci. In this
case, the ideal pointsλ1, . . . , λm in assemblyRm are asymptotically normally distributed
by Lemma 1 with respective densities that satisfy the quadratic bound condition of
Theorem 1 and
fi(M) =
1√
2pi · 1ni[2g(M)]2
=
2g(M)√
2pi
√
ni > 0. (17)
Combining (17) and Corollary 1 we obtain:
Corollary 2 (Square root rule). If the ideal points of all voters are i.i.d., representative i’s
ideal point equals the median voter’s ideal point in constituency Ci for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and
m is sufficiently large then
(w1, . . . ,wm) ∝
(√
n1, . . . ,
√
nm
)
(18)
or, better,
(w1, . . . ,wm) such that φ(qm; w1, . . . ,wm) ∝
(√
n1, . . . ,
√
nm
)
(19)
achieves approximately equal representation.
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4 Heterogeneity within vs. across constituencies
Corollary 2 derived a square root rule similar to that of Penrose (1946) for the i.i.d. case,21
that is, for a degenerate distribution H of the constituency-specific µi-components
of individual ideal points νl = µi + l. We now investigate the robustness of this
rule regarding the degree of preference affiliation within each constituency. Non-
degenerate shocks µi imply positive correlation within each constituency and give
rise to polarization of preferences along constituency lines, which is measured by the
ratio σ2H/σ
2
G.
22 It turns out that for sufficiently strong polarization, a linear weight
allocation rule quickly performs better than strictly concave mappings
This is analytically seen most easily for the case in which all the involved
distributions are normal. First, let all l be distributed normally with zero mean and
varianceσ2G. Lemma 1 then implies that the median of {l}l∈Ci is approximately normally
distributed with zero mean and variance piσ2G/(2ni). Second, let the constituency-
specific preference componentµi be normally distributed with zero mean and variance
σ2H. Constituency Ci’s aggregate ideal point λi – the sum of two independent (approx-
imately) normally distributed random variables – then also has an approximately
normal distribution. Namely,
λi ∼ N
(
0,
piσ2G
2ni
+ σ2H
)
. (20)
Considering the corresponding densities at M = 0 for two representatives i and j yields
fi(0)
f j(0)
=

piσ2G
2ni
+ σ2H
piσ2G
2n j
+ σ2H

− 12
. (21)
This ratio quickly approaches 1 as σ2H → ∞, or if σ2H > 0 and ni,n j → ∞. Corollary 1
then calls for (w1, . . . ,wm) ∝ (n1, . . . ,nm).
We pointed out in Section 3 that heterogeneity within each constituency will
always give rise to different distributions of the sample medians when ni , n j. But
the differences become small and no longer matter for pivotality in Rm when the
heterogeneity across constituencies is sufficiently great. This is illustrated by Figure 1.
21Note that the Penrose square root rule does not refer to weights but top-tier pivot probabilities, which
equal the Penrose-Banzhaf power index of the representatives in Penrose’s binomial voting model (cf.
fn. 5).
22The basic features of polarization are according to Esteban and Ray (1994, p. 824): (i) a high
degree of homogeneity within groups, (ii) a high degree of heterogeneity across groups, and (iii) a small
number of significantly sized groups. Ratio σ2H/σ
2
G serves as a simple measure of polarization of ideal
points ν1, . . . , νn here, where groups are given exogenously. Esteban and Ray characterize polarization
measures for the general case without an exogenous partition of the population.
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Figure 1: Densities of λi and λ j when ni = 4n j and (a) µi = µ j = 0 or (b) µi, µ j ∼ U[−6σ, 6σ]
It depicts the density functions of ideal points λi and λ j when Ci is four times larger
than constituency C j, so that the standard deviation σi of the median of {l}l∈Ci is half
the standard deviation σ j = σ of the median of {l}l∈C j . Panel (a) shows the densities
when σ2H = 0 (or when we condition on µi = µ j = 0); panel (b) depicts the case when
µi, µ j ∼ U[−6σ, 6σ]. The densities of λi and λ j in panel (b) are very hard to distinguish
in a neighborhood of the median M = 0. This neighborhood’s size increases in σ2H,
and it coincides with the relevant policy range in which the Condorcet winner of Rm
is most likely located under simple majority rule.
Recall that the uniform distribution on [a, b] has a variance of (b−a)2/12. So panel (b)
shows a situation with σ2H = 12σ
2. If we assume, as above, that all l are normal with
variance σ2G then σ j = σ corresponds to σ
2
G = (2n j/pi) · σ2. Panel (b) hence reflects a
preference dissimilarity or polarization ratio of σ2H/σ
2
G = 6pi/n j, which is tiny when
one thinks of typical real-world population figures n j.
This suggests that the phase transition between optimality of a square root rule
to optimality of a linear rule can be very fast. Figure 2 demonstrates this when a
population partition corresponding to the current European Union with 27 member
states (EU27) is considered. The dashed line illustrates the (interpolated) optimal
coefficients α∗ as a function of σ2H/σ
2
G when we search for the best rule in the class
(w1, . . . ,wm) ∝ (n1α, . . . ,nmα) (22)
for α ∈ {0, 0.01, . . . , 1.99, 2};23 the solid line analogously depicts α∗ when one searches
23Specifically, we consider l ∼ U[−0.5, 0.5] and µi ∼ N(0, σ2H) with 0 ≤ σ2H ≤ 10−6 and determine
estimates of the pivot probabilities pii(R27) which are induced by a given value of α via Monte Carlo
simulation. The considered objective is to minimize ‖·‖1-distance between individual pivot probabilities
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Figure 2: Best coefficient α for direct (dashed line) and Shapley value-based allocation rules
(solid line) with n1, . . . ,n27 defined by EU27 population data
within the class of Shapley value-based rules
(w1, . . . ,wm) such that φ(qm; w1, . . . ,wm) ∝ (n1α, . . . ,nmα) . (23)
Optimality of the square root rule can be seen to break down very quickly; already
small degrees of preference dissimilarity across constituencies render a linear rule
based on the Shapley value optimal.24 This makes it possible to base design
recommendations on rather qualitative assessments of polarization, i.e., it is not
necessary to obtain precise estimates of σ2H/σ
2
G in applications.
Note that Figure 2 considers real EU population data but counterfactually assumes
Council decisions to be taken by a simple majority. However, Figure 1 suggests that a
majority threshold of q = 50% may not be a critical condition for optimality of a linear
Shapley rule, provided that σ2H > 0. We will make this claim precise in the remainder
of the section.
When we presume that assembly Rm uses the 50%-majority threshold defined in
equation (2), the representative P : m defined by (3) can be considered as the pivotal
member ofRm without much qualification. We can generalize our model and consider
arbitrary relative majority thresholds q ∈ [0.5; 1) if we are willing to accept a weaker
notion of pivotality. The complication is that the set of policy options that are q-
majority undominated is no longer generically unique when q > 0.5; supermajority
rules induce cores which typically consist of entire intervals. We can, nevertheless,
and the egalitarian ideal of (1/n, . . . , 1/n) ∈ Rn.
24That α∗ fails to converge to 1 when the simpler weight-based rule in (22) is concerned attests to the
combinatorial nature of weighted voting, which cannot be totally ignored even for m = 27.
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generalize the quota definition in (2) to
qm ≡ q
m∑
j=1
w j, (24)
for q ∈ [0.5; 1) and consider the representative P : m defined by (3) to be pivotal. This
may be justified most easily by supposing that a legislative status quo x◦ ≈ ∞ exists
and that formation of a winning coalition proceeds qualitatively in the same fashion
as is sometimes assumed in order to motivate the Shapley value: coalition formation
starts with the most enthusiastic supporters of change on the left, iteratively includes
representatives further to the right, and gives all bargaining power to the first – and
least enthusiastic – member who brings about the required supermajority.25
Denote an m-member assembly Rm which uses the relative decision quota q ∈
[0.5; 1) and chooses policy x∗ = λP : m as defined by (3)–(4) and (24) by Rm,q. If q > 0.5,
the corresponding pivot probabilities pii(Rm,q) and pi j(Rm,q) of representatives i and j
in general fail to exhibit the limit behavior with respect to m which is characterized in
Theorem 1. So Corollaries 1 and 2 do not apply when q > 0.5.26
However, a second asymptotic relationship applies for q = 0.5 as well as
arbitrary q ∈ (0.5; 1), for arbitrary fixed m, and without need for any kind of replica
structure. Specifically, we can consider the situation in which given non-degenerate
shock variables µ1, . . . , µm, whose common probability density h reflects preference
heterogeneity across constituencies, are scaled by a non-negative factor t. Individual
ideal points are then given by
νl = t · µi + l (25)
for t ≥ 0. The corresponding ideal point of representative i from constituency Ci is
λi = t · µi + ˜i (26)
with
˜i = median {l : l ∈ Ci} (27)
where we maintain the assumption that all µi and l are mutually independent and
respectively identically distributed for i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and l ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
The i.i.d. case amounts to t = 0; and considering a large parameter t corresponds
25Justifications for attributing most or all influence in Rm to representative P : m in the supermajority
case date back to Black (1948). Distance-dependent costs of policy reform, a strategic external agenda
setter, or the need of assembly Rm to bargain with outsiders can motivate a focus on the core’s extreme
points. Status quo x◦ might also vary randomly on X such that it lies to the left or right of the core
equiprobably (with pii(Rm) then being i’s pivot probability conditional on policy change).
26One can check numerically that when one considers rules (w1, . . . ,wm) ∝ (n1α, . . . ,nmα), the optimal
coefficient α∗(q) for the i.i.d. case, where α∗(0.5) = 0.5, increases non-linearly in q.
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to investigating an electorate which is highly polarized along constituency lines. If
we denote the pivot probability of representative i by pii(Rm,q,t) and the Shapley value
of the weighted voting game v = [qm; w1, . . . ,wm] with qm defined by (24) as φ(v), the
following holds:
Theorem 2. Consider an assemblyRm,q with an arbitrary number m of constituencies and the
relative decision quota q ∈ [0.5; 1). For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} let λi = t ·µi + ˜i, where µ1, . . . , µm
and ˜1, . . . , ˜m are all mutually independent random variables, ˜1, . . . , ˜m have finite means
and variances, and µ1, . . . , µm have an identical bounded density. Then
lim
t→∞
pii(Rm,q,t)
pi j(Rm,q,t) =
φi(v)
φ j(v)
. (28)
The proof is provided in Appendix B and formalizes that the respective orderings of
representatives which are induced by λ1, . . . , λm and by t ·µ1, . . . , t ·µm tend to coincide
when t is large.27 The theorem does not presume that ˜i satisfies (27); the limit (28)
applies also if λi is determined, e.g., by an oligarchy instead of the median voter of
Ci. It is, moreover, worth noting that Theorem 2 does not impose any conditions
like Theorem 1 on densities g1, . . . , gm or voting weights w1, . . . ,wm in assembly Rm,q.
The Shapley value φ(v) automatically takes care of any combinatorial particularities
associated with w1, . . . ,wm; and the convolution with t · µi’s bounded density, 1t h
(
x
t
)
,
is sufficient to ‘regularize’ any (even non-continuous) distribution Gi of ˜i. Applying
Theorem 2 to the specific context of two-tier voting, we can conclude:
Corollary 3 (Linear Shapley rule). If the ideal points of voters are the sum of an individual
component l which is i.i.d. for all l ∈ {1, . . . ,n} and a constituency-specific component µi
which is i.i.d. for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, representative i’s ideal point equals the median voter’s ideal
point in constituency Ci for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, and µi’s variance is sufficiently great relative to
that of l then
(w1, . . . ,wm) such that φ(qm; w1, . . . ,wm) ∝ (n1, . . . ,nm) (29)
achieves approximately equal representation for any given relative decision quota q ∈ [0.5; 1).
The indirect representation of bottom-tier voters which is achieved by this linear
Shapley rule can fail to be reasonably egalitarian when m is small, the distribution of
constituency sizes is extremely skewed or has small variance, or when q is close to
1. This is because the so-called inverse problem of finding weights which induce the
27The density-driven intuition for Theorem 2 which is suggested by Figure 1(b) can also be made
precise: under the additional assumption that the density h of the shock termsµi is Lipschitz continuous,
the density functions of λ1, . . . , λm converge uniformly to that of t · µi. A proof is available from the
authors.
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desired Shapley value often fails to have a good solution in these cases.28 Still, provided
that the considered heterogeneity across constituencies is sufficiently bigger than the
heterogeneity within, the indirect representation achieved by (29) is as egalitarian as
possible.
Whether Corollary 3 for the case of noticeable preference affiliation within
constituencies or Corollarly 2 for the i.i.d. case provides better guidance for designing
a fair two-tier voting system in practice is hard to say. Some preference homogeneity
within and dissimilarity across constituencies seems plausible – whether as the result
of a sorting process (‘voting with one’s feet’) a` la Tiebout (1956), due to cultural
uniformity fostered by geographical proximity and local policies (see Alesina and
Spolaore 2003), or for other reasons. If constituencies correspond to entire nations, as
in case of the EU Council or ECB Governing Council, citizens of a given constituency
typically share more historical experience, traditions, language, communication etc.
within constituencies than across. (This plausibly is the key practical reason for why
the issue of population size differences cannot trivially be resolved by redistricting
in the first place.) However, the collective decisions that are taken by the top-tier
assembly might be primarily about issues where opinions range over the same liberal–
conservative, markets–government, dove–hawk, etc. spectrum in all constituencies.
Moreover, there might be normative reasons outside the scope of our analysis for
pretending that σ2H = 0 even if it is not when one designs a presumably long-lasting,
fair constitution. We, therefore, avoid any specific recommendations here for, say, new
voting rules in the EU Council but warn that the i.i.d. presumption is more knife-edge
and, therefore, seems to require special motivation.29
5 Concluding remarks
This paper has developed two limit results for the probability of being a decisive voter
in order to address the issue of egalitarian representation of individuals in a two-tier
voting system, such as the EU Council or the US Electoral College. Our concern was
the equalization of the indirect influence which bottom-tier voters can be expected to
28This is easily seen, e.g., by considering constituencies of different sizes n1, . . . ,nm and a relative
quota q ≈ 1 which essentially imposes unanimity rule; or by considering just m = 3 constituencies,
so that the only feasible Shapley values are – up to isomorphisms – (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (2/3, 1/6, 1/6) and
(1, 0, 0). A new approach to solving the inverse problem exactly by using integer linear programming has
been proposed by Kurz (2012).
29A third alternative, inspired by the suggestion of “flexible” democratic mechanisms in other
contexts (see Gersbach 2005, 2009), would be to specify different weighted voting rules for different
policy domains. In some policy areas, such as competition policy, small or unstable between-
constituency differences may call for square root weights; while fair decision making in other policy
domains, such as agriculture or fisheries – with heterogenous shares of farmable land and some
members landlocked, others islands – could involve linear weights.
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have on the collective decision in case of a one-dimensional convex policy space. The
square root rule has played a prominent role in the related political discussion in the
EU as well as the scientific discussion of binary policy environments. It was suggested
to apply also more generally by the simulations of Maaser and Napel (2007).
We now provide it with a sound analytical foundation in a median voter environment
(Corollary 2). However, the somewhat counterintuitive square root rule turns out to
have limited robustness. It does not extend to supermajority rules; it does badly in
case of positive correlation of the ideal points at the constituency level. A linear rule
quickly performs better and becomes optimal for sufficiently strong similarity within
constituencies.
This dichotomy is, in some sense, not very surprising. The extensive literature
on optimal voting weight allocations for binary policy alternatives has, for various
objective functions, brought about either a square root or a linear rule (with few
exceptions). Square root rules typically follow from far-reaching homogeneity and
independence assumptions, while a linear rule is called for in case of dependence
and significant across-constituency heterogeneity. For instance, Kirsch (2007) finds
square root weights to minimize the extent of disagreement between the council’s
binary decision and the popular vote with independent ‘yes’ or ‘no’ votes, but a linear
rule if a sufficiently strong “collective bias” of the voters within each constituency
is introduced. The utilitarian design objective of Barbera` and Jackson (2006) calls
for square root weights in their “fixed-size-block model”, while they derive a linear
rule in a “fixed-number-of-blocks model” which divides each constituency into the
same number of blocks of identical voters.30 Beisbart and Bovens (2007) come to a
very similar conclusion when trying to maximize welfare in another binary model:
with i.i.d. utility parameters and simple majority rule, square root weights maximize
total expected utility (and equalize it across citizens). But if an individual’s utility is
perfectly correlated with more other individuals the larger their constituency, then the
square root rule quickly makes way for a proportional one.
So, using a very different and flexible framework, the corollaries derived from
two new limit results for interval policy spaces echo a pattern that has emerged also
in the literature on binary two-tier voting systems. As originally argued by Penrose
(1946), ex ante independent and identical voters call for a voting weight allocation
rule based on the square root of population sizes. However, sufficiently strong
dissimilarity between constituencies renders most people’s basic intuition correct –
plain proportionality does the trick.
30The fixed-size-block model conceives of constituencies as consisting of many equally sized blocks
of individuals whose preferences are perfectly correlated within a block and independent across blocks.
The existence of such blocks – like those in the fixed-number-of-blocks model – would in our setup
imply that, generically, no individual voter is ever pivotal in his constituency. Still, Theorems 1 and 2
could be used to characterize pivot probabilities of the respective representatives.
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Appendices
A Proof of Theorem 1
Theorem 1. Consider an infinite chain R1 ⊂ R2 ⊂ R3 ⊂ . . . of assemblies which involves a
finite number r of representative types, i.e., there exists a mapping τ : N→ {1, . . . , r} such that
τ( j) = θ implies that λ j has density fθ and w j = wθ ≥ 0. Let the share of each type be bounded
away from zero, i.e., there exist β > 0 and m0 ∈N such that βθ(m) ≡ |{k ∈ {1, . . . ,m} : τ(k) =
θ} |/m ≥ β > 0 for all m ≥ m0. If for each θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} the distribution Fθ has median M
and its density fθ satisfies fθ(M) > 0 with | fθ(x) − fθ(M)| ≤ cx2 on a non-empty interval
[M − ε1,M + ε1] for some c ≥ 0 then for w j > 0
lim
m→∞
pii(Rm)
pi j(Rm) =
wi fi(M)
w j f j(M)
. (14)
A.1 Overview
Let us first give an overview of the five steps of the proof. In Step 1, we define
a particular neighborhood Im of the expected location of the weighted median of
λ1, . . . , λm. This essential interval shrinks to {M} as m → ∞. It is constructed such
that the probabilities pθ,
@pθ, and
Apθ of a type-θ representative’s ideal point falling
inside Im, inside Im’s left half, or inside Im’s right half, respectively, can suitably be
bounded. Moreover, we decompose the deterministic total number mθ = βθ(m) · m
of type-θ representatives in assembly Rm into the random numbers /kθ, kθ, and k.θ
of delegates with ideal points to Im’s left, inside Im, and to Im’s right. Knowing the
respective vector k = (/k1, k1, k.1, . . . ,
/kr, kr, k.r) will be sufficient to determine whether
the Condorcet winner is located inside Im or not.
In Step 2, it is established that the weighted median of λ1, . . . , λm is located inside
the essential interval Im with a probability that quickly approaches 1 as m → ∞. As
a corollary, the probability piθ(Rm) of the Condorcet winner having type θ converges
to the corresponding conditional probability piθ(Rm|K ) of a type-θ representative being
pivotal where eventK comprises all realizations of k such that Rm’s weighted median
lies inside Im.
In Step 3, we show that the random orderings of the k =
∑
θ∈{1,...,r} kθ representatives
with ideal point realizations λi ∈ Im asymptotically become equiprobable as m → ∞.
It follows that, with a vanishing error, the respective conditional pivot probability
piθ(Rm|K ) equals the expected aggregate Shapley value of type-θ representatives in Im.
In Step 4, the strong convergence result for the Shapley value by Neyman (1982)
is applied to our setting. Neyman’s result implies that the aggregate Shapley
value of type-θ representatives with ideal points in Im converges to their respective
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aggregate voting weight in each considered weighted voting ‘subgame’ among the
representatives with ideal points λi ∈ Im.
Having established that piθ(Rm) is asymptotically proportional to the aggregate
voting weight of all type-θ representatives with ideal points inside Im, aggregate
probabilities are attributed to individual representatives in the final Step 5.
A.2 Proof
Step 1: Essential interval Im and vector k
We begin by identifying a neighborhood of M and a sufficiently great number of
representatives such that both the densities fθ and the numbers of type-θ represen-
tatives in Rm can suitably be bounded. This leads to the definition of intervals Im
around M which later steps will focus on. Bounds for the probabilities of a type-θ
representative’s ideal point falling inside Im, and more specifically into Im’s left or right
halves, are provided in Lemma 2. The final part of Step 1 introduces the vector k as
a type-specific summary of how many ideal points are located to the left of Im, inside
Im, and to its right.
First note that
0 < u ≡ min
θ′∈{1,...,r}
fθ′(M) ≤ fθ(M) ≤ u ≡ max
θ′∈{1,...,r}
fθ′(M) (30)
for every θ ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Using the continuity of fθ in a neighborhood of M, which is
implied by | fθ(x) − fθ(M)| ≤ cx2, we can choose 0 < ε2 ≤ ε1 such that
5
6
fθ(M) ≤ fθ(x) ≤ 76 fθ(M) (31)
for all x ∈ [M − ε2,M + ε2] and any specific θ ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Inequality (30) can be used
in order to obtain bounds
1
2
u ≤ fθ(x) ≤ 2u (32)
for all x ∈ [M − ε2,M + ε2] and all θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} which do not depend on θ. Due to the
existence of m0 we can also choose 0 < ε3 ≤ ε2 such that
βθ(m) ≥ β > 0 (33)
for all m ≥ 1ε38/3 and all θ ∈ {1, . . . , r}. And we can determine 0 < ε4 ≤ ε3 such that
24 < uβ · (mβ) 140 ≤ uβm 140θ (34)
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for all m ≥ 1ε48/3 , where mθ ≡ βθ(m) ·m.
Then define
ε(m) ≡ m− 38 (35)
and note that ε(m) ≤ ε4 iff m ≥ m1 ≡ 1ε48/3 ≥ m0. So, whenever we consider a
sufficiently large number of representatives (specifically, m ≥ m1), inequalities (31)–
(34) are satisfied. We refer to
Im ≡ [M − ε(m),M + ε(m)] (36)
as the essential interval. The probability of an ideal point of type θ to fall inside Im is
pθ ≡
M+ε(m)∫
M−ε(m)
fθ(x)dx. (37)
For realizations in the left and right halves of Im we respectively obtain the probabilities
@pθ ≡
M∫
M−ε(m)
fθ(x)dx and
Apθ ≡
M+ε(m)∫
M
fθ(x)dx, (38)
with @pθ +
Apθ = pθ.
Lemma 2. For m ≥ m1 we have
5
3
fθ(M)ε(m) ≤ pθ ≤ 73 fθ(M)ε(m), (39)
5
6
fθ(M)ε(m) ≤ @pθ, Apθ ≤ 76 fθ(M)ε(m), (40)
uβm−
3
8
θ ≤ pθ ≤ 4um−
3
8
θ , and (41)
1
2
uβm−
3
8
θ ≤
@pθ,
Apθ ≤ 2um−
3
8
θ . (42)
Proof. The inequalities can be concluded from (31)–(33), mθ = βθm, and β < 1. 
Now for any realization λ of the ideal points in assembly Rm, let
kθ ≡ #{ j : τ( j) = θ and λ j ∈ [M − ε(m),M + ε(m)]} (43)
denote the number of type-θ representatives with a policy position in the essential in-
terval, i.e., no more than ε(m) away from the expected sample median M. Analogously,
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let
/kθ ≡ #{ j : τ( j) = θ and λ j ∈ (−∞,M − ε(m))} (44)
and
k.θ ≡ #{ j : τ( j) = θ and λ j ∈ (M + ε(m),∞)} (45)
denote the random number of type-θ representatives to the left and to the right of Im.
One can conceive of λ-realizations as the results of a two-part random experiment:
in the first part, it is determined for each λ j whether it is located to the right of Im, to
its left, or inside Im, e.g., by drawing a vector l = (l1, . . . , lm) of independent random
variables where li = 1 (−1) indicates a realization of λi to the right (left) of Im and li = 0
indicates λi ∈ Im (with probabilities 12 − @pθ, 12 − Apθ, and pθ, respectively). This already
fixes /kθ, kθ, and k.θ for each θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} and is summarized by the vector
k = (/k1, k1, k.1, . . . ,
/kr, kr, k.r). (46)
In the second part, the exact ideal point locations are drawn. It will turn out that those
outside Im can be ignored with vanishing error; and the kθ type-θ ideal points inside
have conditional densities fˆθ with
fˆθ(x) ≡ fθ(x)pθ for x ∈ Im. (47)
Step 2: Type θ’s aggregate pivot probability piθ(Rm) converges to the conditional
probability piθ(Rm|K) of type θ being pivotal in Im
We next appeal to Hoeffding’s inequality31 in order to obtain bounds on the probability
that the shares of representatives
/kθ
mθ
, kθmθ , and
k.θ
mθ
with ideal points to the left, inside, or
right of Im deviate by more than a specified distance from their expectations. These
bounds will imply that one can condition on the pivotal ideal point lying inside Im in
later steps of the proof with an exponentially decreasing error.
Hoeffding’s inequality concerns the average X ≡ 1n ·
n∑
i=1
Xi of n independent bounded
random variables Xi ∈ [ai, bi] and guarantees
Pr
{∣∣∣X − E[X]∣∣∣ > t} ≤ 2 exp
 −2t
2n2
n∑
i=1
(bi − ai)2
 . (48)
31See Hoeffding (1963, Theorem 2).
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Our specific construction will involve only random variables Xi ∈ [0, 1], so that
Pr
{∣∣∣X − E[X]∣∣∣ > t} ≤ 2 exp (−2t2n) . (49)
We will put n = mθ for a fixed θ ∈ {1, . . . , r}, so that n → ∞ as m → ∞, and choose
t = n− 25 , which implies t(n) ε(m). For this choice
Pr
{∣∣∣X − E[X]∣∣∣ > n− 25 } ≤ 2 exp (−2n 15 ) , (50)
i.e., the probability of “extreme realizations” exponentially goes to zero as m → ∞
(and hence n = mθ →∞).
Lemma 3. For each θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} we have:
(I) Pr
{
/kθ
mθ
∈
[
1
2 − @pθ −m−
2
5
θ ,
1
2 − @pθ + m−
2
5
θ
]}
≥ 1 − 2 exp
(
−2m 15θ
)
(II) Pr
{
kθ
mθ
∈
[
pθ −m−
2
5
θ , pθ + m
− 25
θ
]}
≥ 1 − 2 exp
(
−2m 15θ
)
(III) Pr
{
k.θ
mθ
∈
[
1
2 − Apθ −m−
2
5
θ ,
1
2 − Apθ + m−
2
5
θ
]}
≥ 1 − 2 exp
(
−2m 15θ
)
.
Proof. Let θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} be arbitrary but fixed. For statement (I) we consider the n = mθ
indices j1 . . . , jmθ ∈ {1, . . . ,m} of type θ and denote by Xi the random variable which is
1 if the realization λ ji lies inside the interval (−∞,M− ε(m)) and zero otherwise. In the
notation of Hoeffding’s inequality we have X =
/kθ
mθ
. Since the probability that λ ji lies in
the left half of Im is given by
@pθ and
∫ M
−∞ fθ(x)dx =
∫ ∞
M
fθ(x)dx = 12 , the probability that λ ji
lies in the interval (−∞,M−ε(m)) is given by 12− @pθ. Thus we haveE[X] = 12− @pθ and (50)
implies (I). The statements (II) and (III) follow along the same lines (namely, by letting
Xi be the characteristic function of intervals [M − ε(m),M + ε(m)] and (M + ε(m),∞),
respectively). Note that mθ−2/5  ε(m) = m−3/8 for large m. 
We can use the bounds on pθ in (41) and that βm ≤ mθ ≤ m for m ≥ m1 ≥ m0 in
order to conclude from (II) that for any given θ ∈ {1, . . . , r}
uβ2ε(m) ·m −m 35 ≤ kθ ≤ 4uε(m) ·m + m 35 (51)
with a probability of at least 1− 2 · exp
(
−2mθ 15
)
. A further implication of observations
(I)–(III) is:
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Lemma 4. For m ≥ m1 the inequalities
/kθ <
1
2
mθ (52)
k.θ <
1
2
mθ (53)
/kθ +
2
3
kθ >
1
2
mθ (54)
k.θ +
2
3
kθ >
1
2
mθ (55)
are simultaneously satisfied for all θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} with a probability of at least 1 − 6r ·
exp
(
−2(βm) 15
)
.
Proof. The events considered in statements (I), (II), and (III) of Lemma 3 are realized
for all θ ∈ {1, . . . , r}with a joint probability of at least(
1 − 2 exp
(
−2(βm) 15
))3r ≥ 1 − 6r exp (−2(βm) 15 ) , (56)
since mθ ≥ βm for m ≥ m0 and (1 − x)k ≥ (1 − kx) is valid for all x ∈ [0, 1] and k ∈ N. If
m ≥ m1, we then have
/kθ ≤
(1
2
− @pθ
)
·mθ + mθ 35 ≤ mθ2 −
uβmθ
5
8
2
+ mθ
3
5 =
mθ
2
−mθ 35
uβm
1
40
θ
2
− 1
︸         ︷︷         ︸
>0
<
1
2
mθ (57)
for anyθ ∈ {1, . . . , r}. The first inequality follows directly from (I), the second inequality
uses (42), and the final inequality follows from (34). Analogous inequalities pertain to
k.θ.
Moreover, we can conclude
/kθ +
2
3
kθ ≥
(1
2
− @pθ
)
·mθ −mθ 35 + 2pθ3 mθ −
2
3
mθ
3
5 (58)
=
mθ
2
− 5
3
mθ
3
5 +
(
2pθ
3
− @pθ
)
mθ (59)
=
mθ
2
+
5
3
mθ
3
5
(
2 Apθ
5
mθ
2
5 −
@pθ
5
mθ
2
5 − 1
)
(60)
≥ mθ
2
+
5
3
mθ
3
5
( 1
10
· 3
7
pθ ·mθ 25 − 1
)
(61)
≥ mθ
2
+
5
3
mθ
3
5
uβmθ 14024 − 1
︸          ︷︷          ︸
>0
>
1
2
mθ. (62)
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The first inequality uses (I) and (II); the second one employs (39) and (40); the third
applies (41); and the final one invokes (34). Analogous inequalities pertain to k.θ +
2
3kθ. 
Lemma 4 implies that the respective unweighted sample median among represen-
tatives of type θ is located within Im for all θ ∈ {1, . . . , r}with a probability that quickly
approaches 1. The same must a fortiori be true for the pivotal assembly member, i.e.,
the weighted median among all representatives.
We collect in the setK allk = (/k1, k1, k.1, . . . , /kr, kr, k.r) such that the events considered
by Lemma 3, (I)–(III), are realized for all θ ∈ {1, . . . , r}. The inequalities in Lemma 4
then hold for any k ∈ K . We can decompose the probability piθ(Rm) of some type-θ
representative being pivotal into conditional probabilities piθ(Rm|K ) and piθ(Rm|¬K )
which respectively concern onlyλ-realizations wherek ∈ K andk < K . Then Lemma 4
implies
piθ(Rm) = Pr{K} · piθ(Rm|K ) + Pr{¬K} · piθ(Rm|¬K )
= piθ(Rm|K ) + O(exp(−2m 15 )). (63)
Step 3: piθ(Rm|K) converges to the expectation of type θ’s Shapley value inside Im
Now condition on some k ∈ K such that exactly ∑θ kθ = k ideal points fall inside
the essential interval, where k is asymptotically proportional to ε(m) ·m = m 58 by (51).
Label them 1, . . . , k for ease of notation and let % ∈ Sk denote an arbitrary element of
the space Sk of permutations which bijectively map (1, . . . , k) to some ( j1, . . . , jk). The
conditional probability for the event that the k ideal points located in Im are ordered
exactly as they are in % by the second step of the experiment is
p(%|k) ≡
∫ ε(m)
−ε(m)
∫ ε(m)
x j1
. . .
∫ ε(m)
x jk−1
fˆ j1(x j1) . . . fˆ jk(x jk) dx jk . . . dx j2dx j1 . (64)
Lemma 5. For all m ≥ m1, any k ∈ K with ∑θ kθ = k and permutation % ∈ Sk we have
p(%|k) = 1
k!
+
1
k!
·O(m− 18 ). (65)
Proof. The premise | fθ(x) − fθ(M)| ≤ cx2 for x ∈ Im permits us to choose δ ∈ O(ε(m)2)
with δ ≤ 12 such that
(1 − δ) · fθ(M) ≤ fθ(x) ≤ (1 + δ) · fθ(M) (66)
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and, equivalently,
(1 − δ) · fˆθ(M) ≤ fˆθ(x) ≤ (1 + δ) · fˆθ(M) (67)
for all types 1 ≤ θ ≤ r and all x ∈ Im. Integrating (66) on Im yields
2ε(m)(1 − δ) · fθ(M) ≤ pθ ≤ 2ε(m)(1 + δ) · fθ(M). (68)
With these bounds we can conclude from fˆθ(M) =
fθ(M)
pθ
that
1 − δ
2ε(m)
≤ 1
2ε(m)(1 + δ)
≤ fˆθ(M) ≤ 12ε(m)(1 − δ) ≤
1 + 2δ
2ε(m)
(69)
because 1/(1 − δ) ≤ 1 + 2δ.
Using (1 − δ)k ≥ 1 − kδ and (1 + δ)k ≤ 1 + 2kδ for kδ ≤ 1,32 and noting that the
hypercube [0, 1]k can be partitioned into k! polytopes {x ∈ [0, 1]k : x j1 ≤ x j2 ≤ . . . ≤ x jk}
with equal volume, inequality (67) yields
p(%|k) ≥ (1 − δ)k
∫ ε(m)
−ε(m)
∫ ε(m)
x j1
. . .
∫ ε(m)
x jk−1
fˆ j1(M) . . . fˆ jk(M) dx jk . . . dx j2dx j1 (70)
=
(1 − δ)k
k!
· fˆ j1(M) . . . fˆ jk(M)
∫ ε(m)
−ε(m)
∫ ε(m)
−ε(m)
. . .
∫ ε(m)
−ε(m)
1 dx jk . . . dx j2dx j1 (71)
=
(1 − δ)k
k!
· fˆ j1(M) . . . fˆ jk(M) · (2ε(m))k (72)
(69)≥ (1 − δ)
2k
k!
≥ 1 − 2kδ
k!
(73)
and, analogously,
p(%|k) ≤ (1 + δ)k
∫ ε(m)
−ε(m)
∫ ε(m)
x j1
. . .
∫ ε(m)
x jk−1
fˆ j1(M) . . . fˆ jk(M) dx jk . . . dx j2dx j1 (74)
=
(1 + δ)k
k!
· fˆ j1(M) . . . fˆ jk(M) · (2ε(m))k (75)
(69)≤ (1 + δ)
k(1 + 2δ)k
k!
≤ (1 + 2δ)
2k
k!
≤ 1 + 8kδ
k!
. (76)
32The first statement is easily seen by induction on k. The second follows from
(1 + δ)k =
k∑
j=0
(
k
j
)
δ j ≤ 1 +
k∑
j=1
1
j!
(kδ) j︸︷︷︸
≤kδ
≤ 1 + kδ
k∑
j=1
1
j!︸︷︷︸
≤e−1
≤ 1 + 2kδ.
Since k is asymptotically proportional to m
5
8 and ε(m)2 = m− 68 we can choose δ ∈ O(m− 68 ) with (kδ) j ≤ kδ
for j ≥ 1 whenever m is large enough.
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This implies ∣∣∣∣∣p(%|k) − 1k!
∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 8kδk! . (77)
Because k ∈ O(m 58 ) and δ ∈ O(m− 68 ), the relative error |p(%|k)− (k!)−1|
/
(k!)−1 tends to zero
at least as fast as O(m− 18 ). 
So even though the probabilities of the orderings % ∈ Sk of the k agents inside
Im differ depending on which specific % is considered and what are the involved
representative types (i.e., which k is considered), these differences vanish and all
orderings become equiprobable as m gets large.
Type θ’s conditional pivot probability can be written as
piθ(Rm|K ) =
∑
k∈K
P(k) ·
{ ∑
%∈Sk :ψ(k,%)=θ
p(%|k)
}
, (78)
where P(k) denotes the probability of k conditional on event {k ∈ K} and function
ψ : K × Sk → {1, . . . , r} identifies the type θ′ of the pivotal member in Rm when k
describes how the representative types are divided between Im and its left or right,
and % captures the ordering inside Im. Lemma 5 approximates the probability of
ordering % conditional on k as 1/k!, and one thus obtains
piθ(Rm|K ) =
∑
k∈K
P(k) · φθ(k) + O(m− 18 ) (79)
with
φθ(k) =
∑
%∈Sk :ψ(k,%)=θ
1
k!
. (80)
Because a constant factor 1k! pertains to each ordering % ∈ Sk, φθ(k) equals the
probability that, as the weights w1,w2, . . . ,wk of the k representatives inside Im are
accumulated in uniform random order, the threshold q(k) ≡ qm −∑θ∈{1,...,r} /kθwθ is first
reached by the weight of a type-θ representative. The term φθ(k) is, therefore, simply
the aggregated Shapley value of the type-θ representatives in the weighted voting
game defined by quota q(k) and weight vector (w1,w2, . . . ,wk). Equation (79) states
that piθ(Rm|K ) converges to the expectation of this Shapley value φθ(k).
Step 4: Type θ’s Shapley value φθ(k) converges to θ’s relative weight in Im
Condition k ∈ K implies 13 ·
∑
θ∈{1,...,r} kθwθ ≤ q(k) ≤ 23 ·
∑
θ∈{1,...,r} kθwθ (see Lemma 4).
And our premises guarantee that the relative weight of each individual representative
in Im shrinks to zero. The “Main Theorem∗” in Neyman (1982), therefore, has the
following corollary:
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Lemma 6 (Neyman 1982). Given that k ∈ K ,
φθ(k) =
kθwθ∑r
θ′=1 kθ′wθ′
· (1 + µ(m)) with lim
m→∞ |µ(m)| = 0. (81)
Proof. Neyman’s theorem considers an infinite sequence of weighted voting games
[qn;wn] with n voters whose individual relative weights wni approach 0, and
in which the relative quota qn is bounded away from 0 and 100% (or at least
limn→∞ qn/(maxi wni ) = ∞). Neyman establishes that33
lim
n→∞ |φTn(q
n;wn) −
∑
i∈Tn
wni | = 0 (82)
holds for any sequence of voter subsets Tn ⊆ {1, . . . ,n}, where φTn(qn;wn) denotes their
aggregate Shapley value. (We here consider qn = q(k)/wΣ, wn = (w1,w2, . . . ,wk)/wΣ
and Tn = {i ∈ N : τ(i) = θ} for N = {1, . . . , k} and wΣ = ∑i∈N wi.34)
It is trivial that (81) holds if wθ = 0 = φθ(k). So we can assume wθ > 0, and because
there is at least the proportion β > 0 of representatives from each type in Im for large
m, the aggregate relative weight of θ-type representatives in Im is bounded away from
0, i.e.,35
lim infm→∞
kθwθ∑r
θ′=1 kθ′wθ′
> 0. (83)
Therefore, not only the absolute error µ˜(m) made in approximating φθ(k) = φTn(qn;wn)
by kθwθ∑r
θ′=1 kθ′wθ′
but also the relative error µ(m) ≡ µ˜(m)/ kθwθ∑r
θ′=1 kθ′wθ′
must vanish as m →
∞. 
Step 5: Attributing aggregate pivot probabilities to individual representatives
It then remains to disaggregate the pivot probabilities piθ(Rm) and piθ′(Rm) of types θ
and θ′ to individual representatives i and j. The aggregate relative weight of type-θ
representatives in the essential interval satisfies
kθwθ∑r
θ′=1 kθ′wθ′
=
βθ(m)mpθwθ(1 + O(m−
2
5 ))∑r
θ′=1 βθ′(m)mpθ′wθ′(1 −O(m− 25 ))
=
βθ(m)pθwθ∑r
θ′=1 βθ′(m)pθ′wθ′
(
1 + O(m−
2
5 )
)
(84)
33We somewhat specialize his finding and adapt the notation.
34Our notation leaves some inessential technicalities implicit: K really refers to a family of such sets,
parameterized by m; we implicitly consider a sequence of k-vectors such that n = k→∞ as m→∞.
35The limit itself need not exist because our premises do not rule out that, e.g., mθ is periodic in m.
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for any k ∈ K (see (II) in Lemma 3).36 Combining this with equations (63), (79) and
(81) yields
lim
m→∞
piθ(Rm)
piθ′(Rm) = limm→∞
βθ(m)pθwθ
βθ′(m)pθ′wθ′
= lim
m→∞
βθ(m) fθ(M)wθ
βθ′(m) fθ′(M)wθ′
(85)
for arbitrary θ, θ′ ∈ {1, . . . , r}. Here, the final equality uses
lim
m→∞
pθ
pθ′
= lim
m→∞
∫ ε(m)
−ε(m) fθ(x)dx∫ ε(m)
−ε(m) fθ′(x)dx
=
fθ(M)
fθ′(M)
, (86)
which can be deduced from (68).
Our main result then follows from noting that the mθ = βθ(m) ·m representatives of
type θ in assembly Rm are symmetric to each other and, therefore, must have identical
pivot probabilities in Rm. Hence
lim
m→∞
pii(Rm)
pi j(Rm) = limm→∞
piτ(i)(Rm)/βτ(i)(m)
piτ( j)(Rm)/βτ( j)(m) =
fi(M)wi
f j(M)w j
. (87)

A.3 Remarks
Let us end this appendix with remarks on possible further generalizations. First, the
quadratic bound on fθ’s variation in a neighborhood of M could be relaxed by choosing
different constants in equations (35) and (49): t(mθ) = m−b1θ with b1 <
1
2 is all that is
needed in order to ensure a vanishing error probability in (49); and ε(m) = m−b2 with
b2 < b1 in (35) is sufficient for ε(m) t(mθ). Then a local bound | fθ(x)− fθ(M)| ≤ cxa for
a > 1−b2b2 is sufficient to establish Lemma 5. Requirement b2 < b1 <
1
2 leaves generous
room for a < 2, but implies a > 1.
Second, it is actually sufficient to assume local continuity of all fθ at M, rather
than any strengthening of this,37 if one appeals to an unpublished result by Abraham
Neyman. When, as in our setting, all voting weights have the same order of magnitude,
the uniform convergence theorem of Neyman (1982) for the Shapley value can be
generalized to hold for all random order values that are ‘sufficiently close’ to the Shapley
36To see the second equality note that for y ∈ (0, 12 ) we have 11−y = 1 + y + y2 + . . . ≤ 1 + 2y = 1 + O(y).
Similarly, 11−y ≥ 1 + y = 1 + O(y) and so 11−y = 1 + O(y).
37Local continuity of fθ is obviously necessary: a modification of fθ(M) – with fθ(x) unchanged
for x , M – would affect wi fθ(M) but not pii(Rm). Also the requirement of positive density at the
common median cannot be relaxed. This is seen, e.g., by considering densities fi, f j where fi(x) = 0 on a
neighborhood Nε(M) while f j(M) = 0 with f j(x) > 0 for x ∈ Nε(M) \ {M}; then pii(Rm)/pi j(Rm) converges
to 0 rather than wi/w j.
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value. More specifically, consider the expected marginal contribution of a voter i ∈
{1, . . . , k}
Φi(v) ≡
∑
%∈Sk
p(%) · [v(Ti(%) ∪ {i}) − v(Ti(%))] (88)
in a weighted voting game v = [q; w1, . . . ,wk], where any given permutation % ∈ Sk on
N = {1, . . . , k} has probability p(%), and Ti(%) ⊂ N denotes the set of i’s predecessors in %,
i.e., Ti(%) = { j : %( j) < %(i)}. The random order value Φ(v) equals the Shapley value φ(v)
if p(%) = 1k! . This equiprobability can, for instance, be obtained by letting % be defined
by the order statistics of a vector of random variables X = (X1, . . . ,Xk) with mutually
independent and [0, 1]-uniformly distributed X1, . . . ,Xk. The latter assumption can be
relaxed somewhat without destroying the asymptotic proportionality of i’s weight wi
and Φi(v) which Neyman (1982) has established when Φ(v) = φ(v):
Theorem 3 (Neyman, personal communication). Fix L > 1. For every ε > 0 there
exist δ > 0 and K > 0 such that if v is the weighted voting game v = [q; w1, . . . ,wk]
with w1, . . . ,wk > 0,
∑k
i=1 wi = 1, K · maxi wi < q < 1 − K · maxi wi, maxi, j wi/w j < L,
and {p(%)}%∈Sk in (88) is defined by the order statistics of independent [0, 1]-valued random
variables X1, . . . ,Xk with densities fi such that 1 − δ < fi(x) < 1 + δ for every x ∈ [0, 1] and
i ∈ {1, . . . , k} then
k∑
i=1
|wi −Φi(v)| < ε. (89)
Of course, one can equivalently let {p(%)}%∈Sk be defined by the order statistics of
independent Im-valued random variables with densities fˆ1, . . . , fˆk, instead of [0, 1]-
valued ones, if the theorem’s condition 1 − δ < fi(x) < 1 + δ is replaced by the
requirement that 1−δ2ε(m) < fˆi(x) <
1+δ
2ε(m) for all x ∈ Im.
The values of δ and L which one obtains for a given ε in Theorem 3 apply to any
value of k. We consider the weighted voting subgames played by the k =
∑
θ∈{1,...,r} kθ
representatives with realizations λi ∈ Im for given k ∈ K . The relative weight of any
such representative i, wˆi = wi/
∑
θ∈{1,...,r} kθwθ, approaches zero as m→ ∞; and so does
the maximum relative weight. Recalling that the corresponding subgame’s relative
quota qˆ = q(k)/
∑
θ∈{1,...,r} kθwθ is bounded by 13 ≤ qˆ ≤ 23 , the condition K ·maxi wˆi < qˆ <
1 − K ·maxi wˆi is satisfied when m is sufficiently large. Any null players with wi = 0
can w.l.o.g. be removed from consideration. Then all weights have the same order of
magnitude, i.e., the choice of L such that maxi, j wˆi/wˆ j < L holds for all k ∈ K is trivial.
Moreover, the conditional densities fˆθ in our setup satisfy 1−δ2ε(m) < fˆi(x) <
1+δ
2ε(m) for
every θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} and x ∈ Im when m is large enough. Specifically, continuity of fθ
in a neighborhood of M implies that for any given ε > 0 there exists ∆(ε) > 0 with
limε↓0 ∆(ε) = 0 such that
(1 − ∆(ε)) · fθ(M) ≤ fθ(x) ≤ (1 + ∆(ε)) · fθ(M) (90)
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for all x ∈ [M − ε,M + ε] and all θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} (cf. inequality (31)). Similarly to
inequality (39) we then conclude
(1 − ∆(ε)) fθ(M) · 2ε ≤ pθ ≤ (1 + ∆(ε)) fθ(M) · 2ε. (91)
Combining the last two inequalities with inequality (47) yields
(1 − ∆(ε))
(1 + ∆(ε)) · 2ε ≤ fˆθ(x) ≤
(1 + ∆(ε))
(1 − ∆(ε)) · 2ε. (92)
So considering ε = ε(m) and any fixed δ, the conditional densities fˆθ satisfy 1−δ2ε(m) <
fˆi(x) < 1+δ2ε(m) for every θ ∈ {1, . . . , r} and x ∈ Im when m is sufficiently large.
Hence, all premises in Neyman’s unpublished Theorem 3 are satisfied by the
corresponding weighted voting subgames of agents with ideal points in Im. Theorem 3,
therefore, ensures the approximate weight proportionality of the aggregate random
order value Φ of the type-θ representatives. Now if one recalls (78) and notices that
the bracketed sum equals Φ(v) with v = [qˆ; wˆ j1 , . . . , wˆ jk] when j1, . . . , jk denote the
representatives with ideal points in Im, we can replace Lemmata 5–6 by the following:
Lemma 7.
piθ(Rm|K ) = kθwθ∑r
θ′=1 kθ′wθ′
· (1 + µ(m)) with lim
m→∞ |µ(m)| = 0. (93)
The proof of Theorem 1 can then be concluded by appealing to (63), hence
lim
m→∞
piθ(Rm|K )
piθ′(Rm|K ) = limm→∞
piθ(Rm)
piθ′(Rm) , (94)
and equations (85)–(87). Importantly, the presumption | fθ(x) − fθ(M)| ≤ cx2 for x ∈
[M − ε1,M + ε1], which Lemma 5 required, is not needed by Lemma 7. It can hence
be replaced in Theorem 1 by the simpler requirement that each fθ is continuous in a
neighborhood of M.
Finally, the assumption that only a finite number of different densities and weights
are involved in the chain R1 ⊂ R2 ⊂ R3 ⊂ . . . could be loosened. However, it is
critical that each representative’s relative weight vanishes as m→∞ in order to apply
Neyman’s results; the asymptotic relation (14) fails to hold, for instance, for a chain
with w1 =
∑
j>1 w j. And because our result depends on a vanishing relative error, which
is considered neither by Neyman (1982) nor Theorem 3,38 it is similarly important that
the aggregate relative weight of each type of representatives is bounded away from
zero. For instance, with just one representative having weight w1 = 1 and β2(m) = m−1
38See, however, Lindner and Machover (2004), where conditions very similar to ours are considered
for the Shapley and Banzhaf values, and the related discussion by Lindner and Owen (2007).
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ones with w2 = 2 (see equation (13)), limm→∞ pi1(Rm) = limm→∞ pi j(Rm) = 0 for any j , 1
but the limit of pi1(Rm)/pi j(Rm) may fail to exist.
B Proof of Theorem 2
Theorem 2. Consider an assemblyRm,q with an arbitrary number m of constituencies and the
relative decision quota q ∈ [0.5; 1). For each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} let λi = t ·µi + ˜i, where µ1, . . . , µm
and ˜1, . . . , ˜m are all mutually independent random variables, ˜1, . . . , ˜m have finite means
and variances, and µ1, . . . , µm have an identical bounded density. Then
lim
t→∞
pii(Rm,q,t)
pi j(Rm,q,t) =
φi(v)
φ j(v)
. (28)
The result easily follows from the definition of the Shapley value and the fact that
the orderings which are induced by the realizations of the vectors λ = (λ1, . . . , λm)
and µ = (µ1, . . . , µm) will coincide with a probability which tends to 1 as t approaches
infinity. To see the latter, ignore any null events in which several ideal points or
constituency shocks coincide and let %ˆ(x) denote the permutation of {1, . . . ,m} such
that xi < x j whenever %ˆ(i) < %ˆ( j) for the real-valued vector x = (xi)i∈{1,...,m}. We then
have:
Lemma 8. For i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} and t > 0 let λti ≡ t ·µi + ˜i, where µ1, . . . , µm and ˜1, . . . , ˜m are
all mutually independent random variables, ˜1, . . . , ˜m have finite means and variances, and
µ1, . . . , µm have an identical bounded density. Then
lim
t→∞Pr(%ˆ(λ
t) = %) = lim
t→∞Pr(%ˆ(µ) = %) =
1
m!
(95)
for each permutation % of {1, . . . ,m}.
Proof. Let us denote the finite variance of ˜i by σ2i and let U ≡ (maxi |E[˜i]|)3. We
can choose a real number k such that the bounded density function h of µi, with
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, satisfies h(x) ≤ k for all x ∈ R. For any given realization µ j = x, the
probability of the independent random variable µi assuming a value inside interval
(x−4t− 23 , x+4t− 23 ) is bounded above by k·8t− 23 . We can infer that the event
{
|µi−µ j| < 4t− 23
}
,
which is identical to the event
{
|tµi − tµ j| < 4t 13
}
, has a probability of at most k · 8t− 23
for any i , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. And we can conclude from Chebyshev’s inequality that
Pr(|˜i − E[˜i]| < t 13 ) is at least 1 − σ2i · t−
2
3 . For t ≥ U, we have |E[˜i]| ≤ t 13 ; and if
|˜i − E[˜i]| < t 13 holds then also
2t
1
3 > |E[˜i]| + |˜i − E[˜i]| ≥ |˜i| (96)
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by the triangle inequality. Hence, the probability for (96) to hold when t ≥ U is
Pr(|˜i| < 2t 13 ) ≥ 1 − σ2i · t−
2
3 for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}.
Now consider the joint event that (i) |tµi − tµ j| ≥ 4t 13 for all pairs i , j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
and (ii) that |˜i| < 2t 13 for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. In this event, the ordering of λt1, . . . , λtm is
determined entirely by the realization of tµ1, . . . , tµm; in particular, %ˆ(λt) = %ˆ(µ). Using
the mutual independence of the considered random variables this joint event must
have a probability of at least
(m2)∏
s=1
(
1 − k · 8t− 23
)
·
m∏
i=1
(
1 − σ2i · t−
2
3
)
≥ 1 −
8k(m2
)
+
m∑
i=1
σ2i
 · t− 23 (97)
for t ≥ U. The right hand side clearly tends to 1 as t approaches infinity. It hence
remains to acknowledge that any ordering %ˆ(µ) has an equal probability of 1/m! because
µ1, . . . , µm are i.i.d. 
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